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AZSTRACT 
The structure  of local  taxation  is an important  determinant  of the 
fiscal  performance  of decentralized  public  economies.  In contrast  to our 
understanding  of local  government  spending,  however,  we know surprisingly 
little about  how cities  and states set taxes.  This study  specifies  and 
estimates  a model  of the institutional,  political,  and economic  determinants 
of the local  decision  to tax.  Redistributive  politics is an important 
determinant  of local tax policy,  at least  for this sample  of 41 large U.S. 
cities  during the period 1961-1986.  The results  cast serious  doubt on the 
validity  of the "representative"  or  average  taxpayer  approach  to behavioral 
modeling  of fiscal  policy for large,  income diverse  governments.  The results 
allow us to predict  the effects  on local  financing  of removing  federal tax 
deductibility  of local  taxes,  an  issue  of current importance  in  the United 
States. 
Robert P.  Inman 
Finance  Department 
Wharton School  of Management 
University  of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia,  PA  19104 The Local Decision to Tax: 
Evidence From  Large U.S. Cities 
There is no more hotly contested political issue in large United States  cities than  the 
setting of the rates of local taxation--and for good reasons.  Local taxes determine both the levels 
of  a city's public services and exactly who pays for those services.  As an economic issue, local 
taxation is important  too.  From the perspective of  economic efficiency, local taxation may have 
significant consequences,  both for resource  allocation within the city between taxed and untaxed 
activities and for the location of  economic activity across communities.' Economic fairness may 
be influenced  as well, particularly  since local taxes take a significant share of household income 
and such local  government  services as education,  health care, and housing can  be important 
determinants of long-run economic opportunity.2 With increasing policy interest  in the possible 
advantages of decentralizing  the United States public  economy, it is important--perhaps  now 
more than ever--that we understand  the economic and political  forces which shape these local 
decisions to tax. 
One contemporary  issue in particular  has heightened  interest  in the process  of local 
revenue  choice  among  U.S.  economists  and  policy-makers:  the  possible  removal of  the 
deductibility for state and local taxes when calculating U.S. federal taxable income.  The debates 
surrounding  the  1986 Tax  Reform  Act  focused  in  large  measure  on  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of dropping local  tax deductibility.  Removal  was thought  to be an  important 
source  of new federal  revenues  which could support broad  reductions  in overall  tax rates. 
Removal might  also increase  the progressivity of  the federal tax code and eliminate an inefficient 
subsidy to the local public sector.  Opponents contended that removal  would not generate  new 
revenues and might well reduce tax fairness and allocative efficiency.3  To resolve the issue it is 
1Wildasin (1986) provides an excellent  introduction to this literature. 
2For a discussion of fairness in the local public economy, see Inman and Rubinfeld  (1979). 
3Supporters  include the initial proponents of  broad-based tax reform; see McLure and Zodrow (1987) and 
Courant and Rubinfeld (1987) for the arguments.  Analyses which question these arguments can be found in 
Cherrnck  and Reschovsky  (1986) and Feldstein and Metcalf (1987). 
1&1L3 important to understand just how state and local taxes might be affected.  Unfortunately, most of 
the research which did address  this question was forced to assume an elasticity of local taxes 
with respect  to federal deductibility.  At the time, there simply  were no compelling  empirical 
studies available on the determinants of local tax policy. 
This paper seeks to provide  such a study.  Two ingredients are necessary:  a model of 
local revenue choice and a data base with sufficient variation in the institutional, political,  and 
economic variables of interest  to estimate the model.  Section II describes the model.  In contrast 
to the usual  model of  local fiscal choice which focuses on a single representative voter, this study 
seeks  to  explicitly  consider the redistributive  nature  of local  revenue  choice.  Section  III 
estimates the model. In contrast  to one year cross-section studies of  local revenue choice whose 
estimated coefficients may be biased because of omitted  government-specific  'fixed effects" (see 
Hausman  and Taylor  (1981)),  this study develops  a large panel data base of 41 cities over 
twenty-five years which  allows unbiased estimation of the model's coefficients.  A "fixed-effect' 
or  'within-group' estimator is employed.  Section IV then addresses  the effects of removing 
deductibility on taxation in our sample cities:  what is likely to happen to local revenues, local 
spending, and federal tax receipts with the loss of deductibility?  Section V offers a concluding 
observation on this research. 
II. The Analytics of Local Revenue  Choice 
A.  The Basic Structure 
Within larger U.S. cities,  the  local  decision  to  tax  is  a decision  made  subject  to 
constraints.  First, local taxation must be decided within the bounds of a local political process. 
Competing coalitions within  the city--the rich, the middle  class,  the poor, and local  business 
interests--all seek to influence the final decision to tax. Second, the mobility of  resources within 
the local and regional economy limit the ability of the city to raise revenues; taxable resources 
may simply leave the taxing jurisdiction  or, for those residents who remain, the taxed activity 
may  be curtailed.  Third,  state  law may  restrict the local community to the taxation of only 
well-defmed activities  or  resources, often further limited  to a pre-specified rate of  taxation.  This -3- 
section outlines a model of local taxation which embodies these political,  economic, and legal 
constraints. 
The model assumes  an elected city  executive--the mayor--responsible  for coordinating 
competing interests over the level of  local taxes and fees.  Pressures come from three sources:  1) 
a city council interested in providing core government services with the lowest tax rate possible; 
2) city agencies interested in providing agency services with the lowest agency  fee possible; and 
3) competitive  taxpayer  coalitions interested in shifting the aggregate burden of local services 
from themselves to other taxpayers.4  City council  is responsible for approval  of the city budget 
and uses broad-based taxes--for  example,  property, income,  and general sales--to finance what 
we usually view  as the primary local  public  services--for example,  police and fire  services, 
education, public health,  and public infrastructures.  City agencies use user fees or selective 
commodity taxes to finance all or a portion of what may be viewed  as the local government's 
private'  service  budget--for  example,  airports,  parking facilities,  tourism  and  conventions, 
hospitals,  public  housing,  sewerage,  and  sanitation.  Fiscal cross-subsidization  between  the 
budgets of the two political bodies is possible.  City council  can raise revenues from general 
taxes sufficient to cover its own activities  as well as subsidize agency activities when user fees 
and selective taxes fail to cover the agency's average costs.  Alternatively,  the agency may set its 
user fees or taxes  above average  costs, earn a profit,  and then  transfer  these  dollars  to the 
council's  general budget. Left to their own devices, city council and agencies would prefer to 
maximize the cross-subsidy from the other to their own budget.  Finally, taxpayers' interests in 
the distribution of  the aggregate city burdens across individual taxpayer  coalitions must be 
make no effort to formally model the local political process which might balance these competing  interests, 
though recent  work by Coughlin (1986) provides one model which might be used to  motivate the empirical 
specifications  used here.  That  model involves an election between two candidates in which candidates cannot 
perfectly  infer voter preferences  over the disthbution of  incomes. Coughlin  shows thai such elections do have stable 
outcomes  over redistributive  policies and that  the final policies chosen correspond to those which would maii,ii.e 
the sum of voter utilities.  If voters have underlying preferences both over the levels of tax rates and the final 
distribution of burdens,  then this paper's  equation (5) would follow from a Coughlin specification of electoral 
politics. 
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respected; these pressures will be specified here by a mayoral preference for  tax fairness.  It is 
the elected mayor's responsibility to balance these competing claims. 
More formally, the mayor proposes  a budget which maximizes the simple sum of each 
political  agent's--council's, agency's,  mayor's--respective  interests.  The  city  council  has 
preferences over  the level of local public goods it can supply (denoted g) and the net average tax 
rate (denoted?) specified as the gross uniform tax rate (denoted  r) net of state and federal tax 
relief paid at an average (over household) rate t:  ? = (1 — t)  r.  The deductibility  of local taxes 
from taxable federal and state income is the most  prominent form of  subsidy in the United States; 
local tax credits, exemptions, or tax-based matching  aid (called "tax-effort" aid) may also be part 
of  'r.  Council preferences over g and? are specified as v (g,7; Yg), where the vector  Yg defines 
the exogenous  determinants  of constituent preferences  (specified below) for the level of core 
government  services.  Core  services g may be uniformly  or differentially  disthbuted across 
households,  but for this study  that distribution  is taken as exogenous.  I assume  that the city 
council prefers to offer more government services and to assess a lower net tax rate (vIg > 0, 
av/a?  < 0)  but  that  the political returns  to these  activities diminish as g rises  and as r falls 
(vIag2 <0, and v/a?2 <0). 
The administering  agency  has preferences  over the level  of the goods  it can  supply 
(denoted  q) and the net fee (denoted 1) that it can charge consumers.  The net fee equals the 
gross uniform fee (f) net of any state or federal government consumption subsidies paid at a rate 
8:  = (1 
— 0)1; Medicare at  Medicaid reimbursements is the most prominent U.S. example of 
such a subsidy.  Agency preferences over q andf are specified as w (q,  Yq), where the vector 
Yq  represent exogenous determinants of  constituent preferences for the level of  (now,  "private') 
government services (Yq).  Like city council,  the agency prefers to offer more  services and to 
assess lower charges (awfaq > 0, aw/af < 0),  but both activities  yield diminishing political 
returns to the agency (2  w/aq2 <0, and  w/af2 <0). 
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Finally, the mayor has preferences  over the distribution of total fiscal burdens amongst 
the competing taxpayer groups  within the city.5  If f3  represents  the share of all taxpayers' 
burdens borne specifically by taxpayer(s) i (1 = 1,..., N), then the mayor's own preferences  over 
taxes and  fees can be represented by m((31,..., 3N-1 ; X), where  the omitted  taxpayer N's share is 
implicitly  included (since E  1) and where the vector X includes those exogenous variables 
(specified  below)  which define  the mayor's preferences  over the relative  distribution  of the 
aggregate burden of  local financing. 
In specifying the burden shares ([3k) , I assume that the burdens of local taxes and fees are 
borne in proportion  to each  taxpayer's  local consumption  of the taxed or priced commodity. 
Workers  bear the full  burden of a local  income tax (inelastic labor supply),  homeowners and 
renters as consumers  of housing bear the full burden of local property  taxation (perfectly elastic 
supply  of  housing  services),  and  consumers  bear  the  full  burden  of  general  sales  and 
commoduty-specific  taxes  and fees  (perfectly  elastic supply  of locally  produced goods  and 
services including  fee-based  local services).6  For each taxpayer group,  therefore,  will be 
specified as: 
=  r(1 —tj)yj +r(l —t)s +(rct)(l —c)b +f(1  —Oj)q1 
{r(l —tj)yj +r3(1 —t)s + (ra)(1 —t)b1 ÷f(1 —8)q} 
where r, and r are city's uniform tax rates on income  (yj, for taxpayer i) and local general sales 
(si, for taxpayer i) respectively,  r is the uniform  local property  tax rate on property (ba, for 
taxpayer i) adjusted for possibly differential  taxpayer property  assessment at rate a (>  1, if 
property  is over-assessed  relative  to the city average,  =  1  if equally  assessed,  and  <  1 if 
51n principle, I could  also include mayoral preferences for the levels of  government  services  and the levels of tax 
rates.  Such an extension  would add nothing of  substance to this analysis,  except to "clutter" the notation. I omit the 
extension. 
6Perhaps the only possibly conuoversial  assumption here is that regarding  the incidence  of property taxation. In 
effect, I am assuming the city is a small part of  an open regional  ecxuniy in which land and other inputs can move 
freely into and out of  city housing production. I am also assuming that the demand for city housing is downward 
sloping--that  is, the  city has some unique attribute which residents value, fc example, cess to the CBD.  See 
Wildasin (1986, pp. 98-109) for a more complete discussion of the incidence  of property  taxation. 
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under-assessed), f  is the uniform fee charged  for commodity  q (qj, for taxpayer i), and (1 
— t) 
and (1 
— O) are taxpayer i's own rate of subsidy for local taxation and fees.7  It is possible to 
show as a first-order approximation  that a taxpayer's share in total burdens  (l3)  rises with an 
increase  in a particular  tax rate  or fee (e.g., r) if the taxpayer's share in that  tax's subsidy 
adjusted tax base (e.g., y, (1 
— 
'ci) /y  (1 
— t)) is greater than the taxpayer's  share in aggregate 
burdens (f3).  Conversely, ,  fails with an increase in a given rate or fee if the taxpayer's share 
in adjusted base is less than his or her share in aggregate burdens.8  The mayor can therefore 
control the distribution  of aggregate burdens across the politically relevant taxpayer groups by 
manipulating aggregate tax rates and fees.9  I shall assume that the mayor has a target distribution 
for fiscal burdens denoted  by the target share, f3 (i = I  N-i), and that deviations from these 
targets are politically costly and increasingly so:  — f3) <0 and m/(f3 
— 3)2 <0.10 
The mayor's target f3 's are defined by the relative political  influence of each taxpayer, specified 
here by the vector X of the exogenous "influence' variables:  =  (X).  Elements of X might 
well include the percent of voters of type i.  The balance between competing council, agency, and 
mayoral  interests  is specified here  by the maximization  of the simple sum of each  agent's 
11 
7The  rate of subsidy for local taxes or fees can  be different for  different taxes or commodities  as well, a subtlety 
I ignore here but do include in the empirical analysis. 
N be the numerator and )  the denominator for the definition of fl  above:  3, = N/D.  Then  for a rate 
(r,,r,r) or  fee  (f) change, calculate afl/() = lID {aN/(.)  —fl DTh()} for ()  r, or  f.  Note 
0 as (aN/a(.))/(aD/a(.))  J3.  As a first-order approximation  aNTh()  a taxpayer i's own net of  subsidy 
base (e.g., for r, (1 —r1)y) and aD/a() a the  aggregate net of subsidy base  (e.g., for r, Z(1 —r)y).  The 
conclusions  above follow. 
91t should be noted that control may not  be perfect in the sense that all possible combinations  of  the fl  s are 
possible. Generally, the mayor would need a separate  tax for  each of the (N—i) relevant  taxpayer group to have full 
control over the f3 's. 
t0For example, m(•) might be specified as a quadratic loss function of the  deviations of the f3, 's from their 
targets: 
in () = M  —  — 
ttDifferent weights  on each agent's preferences are certainly possible, but a full model of council-agency- 
mayoral bargaining would be needed to  justify such  weights in a  compelling  way. 
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V=v(g,7;Y) +w(q,f;Yq) +m(j. 13N_1;X) 
Maximization must occur with respect to economic and legal constraints. 
There are two economic constraints.  First, the revenue raised from any broad-based tax 
will be sensitive  to the net, after-subsidy  rate  of taxation (7) on that  base.  For  example, a 
property tax implies  a higher effective rental cost of housing and business  capital which will 
lower the rate of  household and firm investment.  Further  a high net property tax rate may lead to 
the exit of households  and firms from the taxing jurisdiction,  again reducing the value of the 
available tax base.  Similar arguments  can be offered for local taxes on household income and 
firm profits or for  taxes  on local  sales.  Thus equilibrium  revenues  (denoted R)  from  any 
broad-based tax will equal the gross tax rate (r) times the aggregate tax base (denoted B) which, 
in equilibrium, is sensitive  to the net, after-subsidy rate of  taxation (7): 
R(r) =r*B[7;cB(7,  Y8,Z)J 
where  CB () is the elasticity  of the tax base with respect to the net tax rate specified to depend on 
the demand  for core public goods and a  vector Z of exogenous "Tiebout" variables.  In the case 
of property taxation, B [J is a variant of the now familiar Oates (1969)  capitalization" equation. 
I allow the  long-run  equilibrium  response  of base  to  net tax  rate  changes  to  be negative 
(d.B/d7 ￿ 0),  though  this  equilibrium  response may  take  several  years because of lags  in 
investment and resource relocation.  In the short-run, it is possible that dB/dV =0, a fact which 
has potentially important implications for local revenue choices. 
The second economic constraint faced by the city imposes  limitations on the city's ability 
to raise funds from  fees and selective  sales taxes.  Fees  and selective  sales taxes  are treated 
identically here, as gross user fees (f) above average cost (c) can be viewed as a per unit tax at 
rate (r): f= c + r.  Agency "profits" in the case of user fees or agency "revenues" in the case of 
selective sales taxation can be specified identically as: 
7tCf)  = (f  — c) *q [;  6q (1 Yq, Z)] 
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where f is the net fee to the residents after any state or federal  subsidies,  Eq ()  is the price 
elasticity  of demand for q by consumers purchasing  q within the jurisdiction.  The elasticity is 
again  specified to depend upon demand (Yq)  and regional "Tiebout' (Z) variables.  I assume 
dq/df ￿  0, and that the equilibrium  response  of consumer demand for q with respect to changes 
in  is instantaneous; that is, short-run and long-run elasticities are equal. 
In addition to political and economic constraints, city officials also face state-imposed 
legal  constraints.  First, all cities are required to balance  their budgets  in each fiscal  year. 
Revenues received from own taxes and fees plus dollars received as federal and state aid must 
equal  current accounts  spending  on  g  and  q  arid  interest  payments  (1)  due for  previous 
borrowings.  In the simple case of one public good g costing $1/unit, one broad-based tax levied 
at  the gross tax rate r,  and one fee-based  government service  q costing $c/unit and priced at 
$f/unit,  the  government's  annual  budget constraint  may  be written,  inclusive  of exogenous 
federal and state aid (A) and matching  grants for g at rate p., as: 
4)  g+cq+1=rB+fq+A+p.g. 
Using the economic constraints in eqs. (2) and (3) and re-arranging eq. (4) gives a specification 
for government services, g, as a function of gross  tax rates and fees: 
— [R (r) + A  — I + it(j)J  gr, 
— 
(1—p.) 
where  the exogenous determinants of  R (r) and t(j) are understood. 
While the specification of the city's budget constraint in eqs.  (4) and (4') generalizes 
easily to several broad-based taxes--r becomes a vector of tax rates and total revenue becomes 
the summation of  individual tax revenues--a  second, additional set of  legal constraints makes this 
extension unnecessary for large United  States cities.  While  U.S. cities are often allowed  to use a 
variety of  broad-based taxes, under state law only the local property  tax remains  solely  under  city 
fiscal control.12  In all cities for my  sample period  (FY1961  to FY1986), local income tax rates 
12Even this tax may face legal constraints;  see  section 11-B below. 
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and general sales tax rates are set by state policy.'3  Cities may use these taxes to raise revenues, 
but once chosen, their rates, and thus the level of tax revenues, are exogenously determined.  To 
allow for the effects of local income and sales taxation on local finance, the exogenous level of 
such other tax revenue (now  denoted T) must  be added  to city  revenue in the city's  budget 
constraint in eq. (4). 
One final change in the budget constraint  also seems appropriate, given that the mayor 
andL  city  council  are popularly  elected and responsible  primarily  to the wishes  of the voting 
residents.  Council  and mayor  preferences  will ultimately  focus  on residential tax burdens 
associated  with any increase  in the property tax rate.  If so, property  tax revenues  should be 
denominated  in residential  dollars  as Rh (r) = (1 
— p) R (r), where R  (r)  is  total property tax 
revenues, p is the share of revenues from the commercial-industrial tax base, and (1 
— p) the 
share from the household  sector.  Substituting Rh (r) 1(1 — p) for R (r) in the budget identity now 
permits us to examine  the coffespondence of  local tax rates to local services from the perspective 
of  voting residents. 
Including T in city revenues and substituting Rh (r) 1(1 
— p) for  R (r) re-specifies  the city's 
budget  constraint as: 
[{}  +A+J+]  g(r,f)=  (1—) 
Equation  (4) now captures all economic and legal constraints on the local tax choice.  Together, 
the maximization of  eq. (1) subject  to the constraint in eq. (4) formalizes the political, economic, 
and legal reality of the local decision to tax. Alternatively, eq. (1) can be specified inclusive of 
all economic and legal  constraints as: 
5)  V(r,f) =v{g(r,f),7;Yg}  +w{q(j),7;Y}  +m{131(r,f)  t3N_1(r,f);X} 
Except for small local adjustments in rates or eligible base, the state sets these tax rates; see ACIR (1974), 
chapters 3and4. 
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As specified  here,  the local decision to tax has now been reduced to an 'as if' maximization of 
this constrained objective function V(r, f) 
The  resulting  first order  conditions for an  maximum are given by: 
V  (avYav'\  (am\ 
6)  _))+)_,)+_)=O 
and 
7  aV _(  (ag"\(ait"\  [(aw"(aq  aw1(ai  (am  -o  -. 
Equation  (6) defines the preferred value of the local property tax rate (r), given f.  The choice of 
tax rate involves a balancing of  the political  advantages of  increased revenues for the purchase of 
council services  against the political  disadvantage caused  by the resulting increase  in the net 
property tax rate borne by all residents.  In addition,  changes in r can alter the distribution of 
local fiscal burdens which  may benefit (am/ar >0) or harm  (am/ar <0) the mayor.  Equation (7) 
defines the preferred value for local fees (1), given r.  Increasing fees offers the advantage that 
extra profits are earned for expenditure  on council-provided  services.  Offsetting this advantage 
are  the political  losses from the reduced consumption  of fee-related  services  and  from  the 
increase in net fees.  As for taxes, changes in fees can alter the distribution of fiscal burdens, 
again to the political  advantage (am/af> 0) or  disadvantage (am/af < 0) of the mayor.  Solving 
eqs. (6) and (7) for r andf, defines rand! as functions of the model's exogenous variables: 
8)  r = r{(1 
— 'r), (1 —j, (1 —8), (1 
— i.L), C, A +  1; Y, Yq; EB (Z),  Eq (Z); 
ry,rs,al ...cz_j,(l—ti) ...(l—tN_1),(l—O1)  •..(1—8N_1),X} 
and 
9)  f=f{(l —t), (I —p), (1—8), (1 —ii), c,A +T  1; Yg, Yq; e8(Z), eq(Z); 
r,r,ai ...CZN_1,(l—tl)  ... (l—VN—1),(l—O1) 
... (l—9_i),X}. 
In the end, tax rates and  fees depend upon the economic, political, and  legal environments which 
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defme local fiscal choices.  Understanding  how changes in these environments might alter the 
choice of rand!  is the next task. 
B.  Comparative Statics 
Figure  1 describes the equilibrium  level of city fees, given the rate of  property taxation. 
As defined by eq.  (7) the mayor seeks to balance the virtues of fees generating positive profits 
against the political losses associated  with the higher fees themselves.  The curve denoted t(f) is 
the city's profit function from fees; profits are negative when!  is less than the (constant) average 
cost c of producing q and reach a maximum at  fm,.x when  marginal revenue  equals c ( = marginal 
cost).  The upward bending indifference curve denoted V(f*; r*) is one of a family of mayoral 
indifference curves balancing the gains from higher agency  profits against  the losses from higher 
user fees; the slope of this indifference curve--(dit/df)v  --is positive (f  is a 'bad  which must be 
compensated by i) and  increasing  in f  because  of (assumed) diminishing  marginal gains to 
profits and increasing marginal losses to fees. 
The tangency  of V (f*; r*)  to it(J) defines the preferred level  of fees,  given r, and is 
formally specified  by: 
aw  aw  aq  am 
(7') 
Eq.  (7') is a slightly  re-written  version  of the first-order  condition  in eq.  (7),  allowing  that 
d7/df = (1 
— 8).  The LHS  term  in  {  )  is the MRS between  profits  and net fees (f); the 
numerator is the marginal  loss  from an increase in f while  the denominator is the "shadow value' 
of another dollar of profits to the city council's budget.  This shadow value which  I will denote 
hereafter as (it; r) provides the crucial link between the setting of fees and the decision on tax 











utility to core public services (since 2  v/g2 <0),  and thus a lower "shadow  value' to agency 
profits. Thus, 2Jr <0. 
Figure 2 describes  the equilibrium  city property tax rate, given fees.  The specification for 
the optimal  property  tax rate, given fees, is defmed by eq. (6) and  can be re-written  as: 
I  (av"\  am) 
_______ 
1  1  ](dRh 
1  ( 
noting that dV/dr = (1 
— 'r), or as: 
(6') 
The expression  on  the  left--(dR" /dr)v—is the  political MRS of the  gross  tax rate  (r)  for 
household  revenues  (Rh) and depends upon the political  willingness to trade the net tax rate (V) 
for  government  services  Cs)  multiplied  by  (1 
— t)(1 
— l.t)(l —p),  a  deflator  which  turns 
household tax revenues  into core government  services.  The right side of eq. (6') is the slope of 
the household  revenue schedule with respect to the gross tax rate, allowing for adjustments in 
housing investment  and the exit of residents as r increases.  The peak of the revenue schedule 
occurs at r. The equilibrium  property tax rate--denoted r  in Figure 2--is that value of r 
which just  equates  the political gain  of the extra revenue raised  from  an  increase  in  r-- 
(dR" /dr)  —to the ability of r to raise this revenue--dR"/dr. 
Important is the specification of dR"/dr. Do city politicians set r mindful of its long-run 
effects on tax base--that  is, dR"/dr = Bk (1 + c8), where e <0--or do they ignore the long-run 
consequences of  rate on base and assume c = 0 and thus dR"/dr = B" alone? Figure 2 describes 
the tax  rate  equilibrium  when  politicians  ignore  the  longer-run  consequences  of their  tax 
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Figure 2:  Property Taxation 
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with a slope  equal to dRh/dr =B'  but  the tangency must occur along the long-run  revenue 
curve, Rh (r) evaluated  at r*,  to insure the political equilibrium is also economically  feasible. 
Note  that  if local  politicians  responded  to  the  long-run  incentives  created  by  their taxing 
decisions,  then the equilibrium  would be described by the tangency of a political indifference 
curve to the long-run revenue schedule; in Figure 2 a tax rate to the left of r* would then be 
chosen (assuming diminishing  marginal benefits from g).  Note  that  this lower  local tax rate 
would make local politicians  better off (a higher indifference curve), but only f  they are still in 
office  to  enjoy  the rewards associated with the rate induced increase in local  tax base and 
revenues.  If the benefits of an expanded tax base come after the next election, this rate reduction 
may bring in too  little  revenue  today (along the short-run revenue line with slope Bh) to be 
politically  optimal.  Local  fiscal  policy is  exposed,  therefore,  to  the  dilemma of  time 
inconsistency: what is politically optimal  in the short-run may be non-optimal in the long-run.  If 
there are no credible means of commitment  to the preferred  long-run tax rate, then city fiscal 
policy may be permanently  inefficient.  In fact, such an  inefficient  short-run tax rate equilibrium 
could occur even on the downward side of the local revenue-schedule;  see Buchanan and Lee 
(1982). 
While Figures  1  and 2 show separate equilibriums  for fees and tax rates,  the two are 
linked through the requirement that the optimal level of fees (f) in Figure 1 generate that level 
of profits which  corresponds  to the optimal  property tax rate (r*) in Figure 2.  We have already 
observed that  changes  in the optimal  local  tax rate will alter the "shadow value"  of agency 
profits, 2(it; r), and thus change  optimal fees; an increase in r* lowers X(t) which steepens 
agency indifference  curves  in Figure 1  thereby reducing f's.  Increases in  have a similar 
negative effect on r*.  An increase inf raises agency profits which requires a larger  purchase of 
core  services g, for a given tax rate.  The increase in g, given r, lowers the marginal value of 
government services which  reduces the marginal value of tax revenues and increases (dR"/dr). 
The "steeper' indifference curves in Figure 2 imply a new lower r*.  Here, Figures  1 and 2 are in 
"balance--that  is, as drawnf' is optimal for r*, and  conversely. 
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Changes in the model's exogenous variables will aIterf' and r'. Table  1 summarizes the 
comparative static predictions.  Consider  first the effects of an exogenous change in the city-wide 
average rate of federal or state subsidies for local property taxation, 'r, for example through the 
removal of  deductibility  of local  taxation when  calculating  federal  and  state  income  tax 
liabilities.  The resulting reduction  in t implies an increase in (1 
— t) and (dRh/dr)V for each 
value of r, see eq. (6') above.  Increases in the gross property tax rate are now politically more 
costly, requiring  a larger increase  in revenues  as compensation.  Steeper indifference  curves 
means a lower  preferred r*.  What happens tot? The lower  value of r* implies a higher shadow 
value for agency profits which  flattens the indifference curves in Figure 1; see eq. (7').  A higher 
preferred level of fees results.  Higher fees in turn  feedback  into the tax rate equilibrium and 
reduces r still further, while the new fall in r raises f  again.  We can conclude,  therefore, that 
dr*/d(l — t) <0 and  df*/(l 
— t) >0, as  shown  in Table i.'  A  similar  argument  can  be 
developed to show that an exogenous  reduction in commercial-industrial  tax base (lowering p) 
will also lower r* and raisef; see Table 1. 
Changes in the average rate of fee subsidies--for example, lowering 0 through less federal 
or state residential subsidies for public  housing or hospitals--will also alter r* and f.  Here a 
reduction in  0 raises (1 —8)  which increases (drtldf)v, the slope of the indifference  curves in 
Figure 1.  The added burden from gross fees with the fall in 0 now requires increasing profits as 
compensation.  Steeper indifference curves in Figure  1 imply  a lower value of f  and a reduction 
in agency profits.  From the council's budget  constraint the fall in profits reduces the level of g 
that is possible for each value of r.  The fall in g raises the marginal gains from raising the local 
property tax rate; av/ag rises  so (dRh Idr)v falls.  The flatter indifference  curves  in Figure  2 
imply an increase in r*.  The larger r* "feedback" reduces to the shadow value of  agency profits 
which further reducesf". Thus, df*/d(l 
— 0) <0 and dr*/(1 
— 0) > 0 as shown in Table 1. 
A change  in the rate of  subsidy for core service expenditures  has ambiguous effects on 
andf, however.  For example, an increase in (1 
— .t) increases (dR"/dr)  v as specified by eq. (6') 
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above.  Since government matching  aid has fallen, each increase  in r must now raise more own 
revenues to maintain g and political  support.  The steeper slope to the indifference  curves  in 
Figure 2 implies  a fail in r*.  The fall in r* means a higher shadow value  for agency profits 
which  stimulates an increase in fees and agency profits in Figure 1.  Now, however, the rise in 
profits means an increase in g, given r*, which in turn lowers (dR"/dr)p in Figure 2 acting to 
increase r*.  The  initial  effect of  the fall in j.L is now offset  by the increase in it from the change in 
fees.  Thus no predictions are possible, either  for r* orf'; see Table 1.15 
The final average 'price effect" in the model occurs through exogenous changes in the 
average production cost of fee-based  services.  An increase in c lowers agency profits for each 
value of  f, shifting the profit  curve to the right and down along the horizontal axis in Figure 1.  If, 
as  assumed, fees impose  an increasing marginal loss on the agency and the shadow value of 
profits increases  as it declines, then the new fee equilibrium will involve higher fees, and (most 
likely) lower agency profits.16  If so, the tangency  of an agency's indifference curve to the new 
profit hill will therefore occur to the southeast  of the equilibrium  shown in Figure  1.  For 
property taxation, the fall in agency profits means less g for each tax rate r and thus the slope 
(t.iRhIdr)v  declines  in Figure 2.  Tax  rates therefore  rise. The  increase  in tax rates is not sufficient 
to offset the original fall in agency profits however,  and therefore  core services (g) decline. 
17 
The fall in g increases  av/&g which flattens all indifference curves in Figure  1  (see eq.  (7)) 
further  increasing fees.  In equilibrium, therefore, dr*/dc > 0 and df*/dc > 0. 
While clear predictions for the effects of  tax and fee subsidies are possible in this model, no unambiguous 
conclusions  follow from the comparative  static analysis of a  change in expenditure  subsidies. These results should 
caution those who might use service  price elasticities from expenditure  studies to draw  conclusions about the policy 
effects of  revenue subsidies. 
16  addition to the downward  shift in the profit hill. the slope of  the profit hill at each value of f  may change as 
well.  With a constant elasticity of demand for q, the slope of the profit hill will steepen at eh value of  1.  This 
further encourages  an increase in fees.  It  is possible that the steeper  profit hill will encourage  such a large increase 
in fees that  final agency  profits may increase over the level obtained in the initial equilibrium,  even though the new 
profit  curve is itself  everywhere  below the original  schedule. 
The equilibrium at a new higher tax rate means the siope of the short-run revenue curve is flatter (i.e., 
equilibrium tax base is lower) and therefore  the slope of the council's equilibrium  indifference curve must also be 
flatter, or (dR"Idr)p is smaller in value.  From (6') this can only occur at  higher tax rate if (vThg)is larger in value 
or, with diminishing  marginal  benefits, because g is smaller. 
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Changes in lump-sum federal  and state  aid (A), revenue from  exogenous  tax sources 
(T) , or interest  payments  (I) will  affect r* and? jointly.  From the council's  budget constraint, 
an increase in (A + T — i) implies  more core services (g) for any given property tax rate.  This 
reduces (avig) and increases  (dRh  Idr)v for each value of r,  the steeper  indifference curves in 
Figure 2 mean a lower r*.  The fall in r* is not enough to offset the effect of  more (A +  — I) 
on g, however.'8  The net increase  in g lowers &v!ag in eq. (7'), steepens the slopes of  the agency 
indifference  curves  in  Figure  1,  and  implies  a  lower  equilibrium  value  of f.  Thus 
dr*/d (A + T — i) <0  and df*/d (A + T — i) <0. 
An increase in demands  for public  services  (Y8,  Yq)  will have ambiguous effects  on 
revenues.  First, as a pure "taste" effect, an increase  in the demand for government services will 
increase v/g  which will increase? and r*.  However, there may be offsetting effects if Yg  and 
Yq also change revenue  bases.  For example, if increases in Yq (Yg) induce a parallel upward shift 
to the profit (tax revenue)  curve, then fees (tax rates) will decline.  Yet increases in Yq  and 1' 
may also steepen the slopes of the city profit and revenue curves as exit to outside suppliers and 
residential locations decline.  If so, the steeper profit and revenue curves may encourage fees and 
taxes.  Which of these three  effects dominates is not clear a priori. 
Exogenous  changes  in  the  elasticities  of the  profit and  tax revenue  schedules--for 
example, because  of increased Tiebout competition (Z) in the region--will also influence city 
revenue decisions.  Larger (in absolute value) revenue  base elasticities imply profit and long-run 
revenue schedules which are everywhere flatter and lower than the original schedules.  (Flatter 
from the slope specifications  in eqs. (6') and (7') and lower because the profit curve and the 
short- and long-run revenue  curves will be "anchored" at it(f = 0) and at R(r = 0) respectively.) 
In  Figure  1,  the flatter  slope to the profit curve will act to reduce  fees and profits,  but  the 
concurrent downward  shift in the profit curve acts to increase  fees.  Thus no clear  prediction of 
the effect  of  eq on? is possible.  Plausible arguments can be offered for an increase in tax rates, 
however. With a decline in agency profits,  lower  core services will be provided for each value of 
18The  argument is the reverse to that  in fn. 17 above. 
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r in  Figure  2.19  Thus increases  in r are  politically  more  valuable,  the  required  revenue 
compensation (dR1' /dr)v falls, and r* rises.  Similar arguments apply for an exogenous increase 
in c to show that while r* may fall (a "substitution'  effect) or rise (a 'revenue" effect),fk must 
rise because of an equilibrium decline in tax revenues and a resulting  rise in the shadow value of 
agency profits. 
Comparative static arguments can also be offered to predict the effects of changes in the 
exogenous  determinants  of mayoral redistribution  preferences.  A precise  specification  of 
m (13i  N-1; K) and the available  redisthbutive policy instruments are needed, however.  For 
example, if city officials have a tax instrument for each taxpayer (e.g., Lindahl prices) then the 
preferred redistributive burden can be obtained with each  equal to its target 3. In this case, m 
is always at its maximum, &mIr =0 and am/af  =  0,  and uniform tax rate  (r) and fees (f) 
become irrelevant as redisiribution  instruments.  Without such a complete set of tax instruments 
however, 3 * f3 (for at least some  i) and  amR)r *0 and am/af  0 is  likely.  In this case, r andf 
do become useful redistributive  policy instruments; see  eqs. (6') and (7').  Hence exogenous 
changes  in  through  changes  in r and r,  or the (1 
— t)  's, (1 
— 8) 's, or cr. 's--or 
exogenous changes in  —through changes in taxpayer influence, X--may increase or decrease 
m (),  alter am/J and  amTh7. and change  the first-order  conditions  for a fiscal  optimum. 
Preferred rates and fees  will therefore  change.  In general,  however, no clear predictions are 
possible without further structure to m (); thus Table 1  shows  ambiguous predictions for the 
exogenous redistributive variables. 
One plausible special case seems of interest, however, for it helps explicate the pattern 
and significance of redistribution  changes which are empirically observed for large U.S. cities. 
Three coalitions of taxpayers  are assumed:  rich taxpayers, middle  class taxpayers,  and poor 
taxpayers.  Each taxpayer  wishes  to minimize his or her  share in total tax burdens, ,  by 
influencing the choices of r and f A typical finance structure in my sample cities is such that a 
t9Sufficient for a decline  in  equilibrium profits is  that a2qjf2 ￿  0.  Linear demand curves satisfy this 
resiriction. 
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rich taxpayer's  rises with an increase in fees (their share in the subsidy adjusted  consumption 
of q is greater than i) and falls with an increase  in r (their share  in subsidy  adjusted  property  tax 
base  is less  than 3)20  The pattern is just the opposite for a very poor household whose 3 rises 
as the city raises  property tax rates and whose  f3, falls as the city  raises fees.2'  Middle class 
households  have shares in property  taxation and fees just about equal to their average burden 
share;  their  'S are  therefore unaffected by  small  changes  in  tax  rates or  fees.  In  this 
environment,  redistributive  politics becomes a balancing  of  the interests  of rich  and  poor 
taxpayers.  Individual rich taxpayers  favor property  tax increases  and fee reductions,  while 
individual poor taxpayers prefer to reduce property  tax rates and to raise fees. 
What does such a distribution "game' imply for r and! if  there are small changes in the 
model's exogenous redistributive variables?  If a coalition's initial  equilibrium share  is greater 
than or  equal to the mayor's target share  then any exogenous change which  increases  will 
induce a policy response  to return  closer to its target 3 
22  Increases in r (the rich bear the 
larger  relative burden of  uniform local income taxes) or in (1 
— 're), (1 
— 9), and aj for the  rich 
all increase !3  for the rich. Such exogenous changes will induce compensating increases in r and 
p. 5 above. I have estimated  values of I, for  my average sample  city for households whose incomes  are 
twice the community  average.  Assuming plausible consumption  patterns (roughly one-half of all non-housing 
consumption is made within  the city) and assessment rates (a = .8 for rich households based on Inman and 
Rubinfeld (1979)) the rich's value of 3  equals 1.6 of  the average  residential tax burden.  A rich taxpayer's share of 
adjusted property tax base is about 1.05 of the average adjusted base.  Thus increases in r will lower 3 for a rich 
taxpayer. 
A similar calculation for fees for a household with income twice the community average implies that the rich 
taxpayer pays about twice the average  fee payment. Most residential  fees are paid for  sewerage  and sanitation borne 
in proportion to housing consumption.  Thus the taxpayer's share in the fee base is greater than his average ,. 
Thereftire, inaeases in fees will raise . 
2tPoor households  in my  sample cities are assigned an income equal to half the city  average, they are assumed 
to consume 90% of the non-housing  consumption in the city, and they are given an assessment rate  equal to 1.8 
times the  city average (Inman and Rubinfeld (1979)).  Their estimated  value of 3 is .75 of the average residential 
burden. The poor taxpayer's share of  the adjusted property lax base is just about equal to the average adjusted  base; 
this is so because of the  poor's relatively high assessment rate and the fact that  the poor do not deduct property 
taxation  when paying federal and state taxes. The poor's share of  the adjusted fee base is about .3 of the average 
share, however, because  of  housing subsidies and lower than average  consumption  of  fee-based services.  From the 
arguments  above (pp.  4-5), therefore,  the poor will prefer to increase  fees and to lower rates. 
the initial equilibrium  share is  less  than the  target  share, then all the conclusions which follow from  an 
exogenous increase  in J3 are reversed. 
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reductions inf  so as to lower  back towards its target. Conversely, an increase in r, (the poor 
bear the larger  relative burden of general sales taxation) or in (1 
— ti), (1 
— er), and a, for the 
poor all increase  the poor's  above the initial  equilibrium value.  There is now a compensating 
reduction  in r and a compensating increase inf  so as to lower  the poor's share back to its target.24 
Finally, an increase in the relative political  influence of the rich or the poor coalition (X) will 
lower their  respective target shares, J3, and stimulate adjustments in r andf  For example, if the 
percent of the electorate who are rich (PCR) increases, I3 for the rich may fall,  if so, there will 
be pressure to reduce  for the rich taxpayer and thus, by previous arguments, r will rise  and f 
will fall.  Alternatively, if  the percent of the electorate who are poor (PCP) increases, I3 for the 
poor may fall.  If so, there will be pressure to reduce r and to increase f.  These hypotheses for 
PCR and  PCP--defined now as the elements of  X--as well as those for r, r  and (1  t) will be 
tested  when  estimating the tax and fee equations.  Table 2 will present empirical results generally 
consistent with the pattern  of redisiributive  effects predicted here.  The specific redisthbutive 
structure outlined  above provides one rationale for these results.  I have no doubt however, that 
other,  perhaps  equally  plausible  explanations,  can  also  be constructed.  The point  here  is  a 
modest one:  redistributive politics may well play an important role in local fiscal choice. 
There  has been one final change in the political-legal environment of  the local decision to 
tax which we can also examine  with the model  here: the local property tax limitation movement. 
Two general forms of  limitations are in force.  The first--called "soft' limitations--places various 
voting and administrative  harriers before local politicians as they seek to raise the rate of local 
property taxation.  Typically,  such soft limitations require  a specific voter referendum for all tax 
rate increases above  a certain  annual rate  of growth,  often demanding a 2/3's rate  of voter 
approval.  The second form  of limitation  is an absolute restriction on the level  of the local 
23Th the context of  eq. (7'), the term (am/a?) now becomes  more positive as  rises which in turn flauens the 
slope of  the indifference curves in Figure 2 ((dRk/dr)  becomes smaller).  The flatter slopes in Figure 2 imply 
higher preferred values of  r. The rise in r  lowers the shadow value of  agency profits  which reduces the use of  fees. 
This effect on fees is reinforced  by the fact that (am/a7) has now become  more negavc with the rise in JI,  for the 
rich, further steepening the slope of all indifference  curves  in Figure 1 and further  reducing  fees. 
24Fonnally,  the argument is the reverse of that  in fn. 23 above. 
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property  tax rate  applied  either  to market  value  (e.g.,  California  and  Massachusetts)  or to 
assessed value (e.g., Ohio).  With absolute limitations, the local property tax rate must satisfy the 
constraint:  r ￿7.  An Appendix  details  these  limitations  for the study's  sample.  The 
comparative  statics  of  "soft'  (denoted  s)  and  'hard"  (7)  limitations  are  straight-forward 
extensions of the analysis above.  Soft  limitations can be seen as increasing the marginal political 
costs of raising the local property tax by giving a more visible and politically effective forum  to 
the tax's opponents.26 This increases (dR1'/dr)v in Figure 2 which  in turn implies a reduction in 
r*, an increase  in the shadow value of agency profits,  and a final rise in. Thus, dr*/ds <0 and 
df*/ds > 0, where  increases in s imply a "tougher" constraint.  Hard limitations simply act as a 
barrier--a vertical line at 7 in Figure 2 (not shown)--beyond which r  cannot rise.  If the constraint 
occurs to the left of r*,  then  city rates must fall to 7.  If the constraint is to the right of the 
preferred rate, then the constraint does not bind and rates remain at r*.  Thus dr*/dY ￿ 0.  If the 
constraint is binding and r* must fall to 7, then the shadow value of agency profits is increased, 
and7 will rise in Figure  1.  If r is not binding. then remains unchanged.  Thus, df*/dT ￿ 0. 
See Table 1. 
It is instructive to compare the comparative static predictions developed here with those 
which  might arise from the commonly used "representative" taxpayer model.  Arnott and Grieson 
(1981) provide such a model for local  government taxation.  Maximizing the indirect utility 
function of the representative taxpayer, familiar  optimal tax rules for efficient--i.e., excess burden 
minimizing--local taxation are derived,  allowing for the fact that local taxes may  be exported 
LiinitaIions applied to assessed value may be less resuiclive than market value limitations  if the city retains 
control over the assessment process. Most states, however, have removed this degree of local discretion, giving the 
county or the state itself sole assessment power see Ininan and Rubinfeld (1979). 
For  example, if the "soft" limitation requires 2/3 referendum  approval  and the Umitation  specifies a very low 
reversion (or  "fall back') tax rate without  approval, then r  will settle  at the preferred rate of  the voter in 33% position 
in the distribution of  voter preferences. 
27Applications  of the representative taxpayer model to the empirical analysis of  local taxation  include tnman 
(1979) in a study of property taxation alone, Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) in a study of state-local aggregate 
taxation,  and Holtz-Eakin  and Rosen (forthcoming)  for  their study of property taxation in middle size communities. 
Barro (1979) also uses the representative  taxpayer approh, but rather than tax mix he examines the intertemporal 
distribution  of tax burdens for a single tax. That analysis  yields the now familiar "tax-smoothing"  hypothesis. 
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(e.g., through deductibility)  to non-residents.  Local tax rates (or fees)  are higher for locally 
consumed  goods with low price elasticities of demand and for those goods where taxes can be 
shifted onto non-residents.  The prediction  that tax rates will be higher on those goods where 
taxes can be exported is consistent  with the predictions here for the average revenue  subsidies 
(1  — t), (1 —p), and (1 — 0).  Demand elasticities are also important in both models and again 
identical predictions can result.  The variables most capable of  distinguishing between the two 
models are the redistribution variables  (X, (1 
— ti), a, (1 
— 8), r and r3), variables which have 
no independent role to play in the representative taxpayer model beyond their effects on average 
exogenous  revenue  (T)  or average  revenue  subsidies.  Also important  here,  but  arguably 
insignificant  in  the  apolitical  representative  taxpayer  model,  is the variable  measuring  the 
presence  of a  soft  tax limitation.  The separate  statistical significance  of the redistribution 
variables and of s therefore provide a distinguishing test of the hypothesis that local taxation is 
determined in part by redistribution politics. 
C. Econometric Specification 
A revenue  system for property taxation, user fees,  and selective  sales taxation will be 
estimated to test the comparative  static properties of the revenue model.  To do so, each of the 
exogenous variables  in Table 1 must be specified. 
The uniform subsidy  rate (1 
— t) for local  property  taxation is defined as the weighted 
average of  the individual values of (1 
— t)  for taxpayers in each of the three  income  coalitions in 
the city: poor (for that household  whose income corresponds to the 25th percentile income in the 
city), middle (for the median income  household in the city), and rich (for that household which 
income  corresponds  to the 75th percentile  income  in the city).  There are three sources of 
variation for each  coalition's value of 'ti:  whether  in fact the coalition's taxpayers deduct 
property taxation from their federal and state income taxes, the coalition's taxpayer's  marginal 
redistribution model predicts any sign for the effects of  changes in own-price elasticities (e8  and Eq), a 
result which  is  also possible in the representative taxpayer model as  long as demands are not independent. 
Similarly,  the variables  (A + T — i)  , Y1, Y,  and  will give identical predictions within the two models. 
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tax  bracket on federal  and  state  income taxes  if the family  does  deduct,  and homesteaä 
exemptions and property tax credits from the state available to the coalition's taxpayers.  For this 
study the probability of  deduction is taken to be  each year's national rate of  deductibility for each 
coalition's  taxpayer's income leveL29  Federal and state tax codes define the marginal tax rate ii 
the  taxpayer does deduct;  I use the marginal tax rate  corresponding  to the first dollar of 
deductions  for each  coalition income level.  Property  tax credits and exemptions  were  also 
estimated for each coalition and included in t; generally such subsidies are limited to lower 
income households and available whether or not the household itemizes.  The weights for the 
aggregation of the separate coalition  's were .25 for the poor cohort, .50 for the median income 
cohort, and .25 for the rich cohort. 
The uniform rate of subsidy  to residential  property taxation from commercial industrial 
property (p) is simply the share of  commercial-industrial property in the city's assessed tax base. 
This  rate of subsidy applies uniformly to all income cohorts. 
The rate of subsidy for local user fees is limited to federal hospital and housing  transfers 
for the poor and elderly; thus in any one year there will be no variation in (1 
— O)  across our 
cities.  I allow for any year to year trend in this variable only  crudely through the inclusion of a 
year time dummy variable (Time).  A similar  specification is adopted, for similar reasons, for the 
average cost of  fee-based government services (c). 
Federal  and state  government matching  grants for local spending  on  core  services, 
(1 
— ji), do vary across the sample  cities, however.  The two major  programs are assistance for 
welfare spending on the current account (for those cities with this fiscal responsibility) and city 
capital outlays;  estimates  of these matching  rates have been developed for city expenditure data 
and are included in this study as (1 
— j.t) and (1 
— )  respectively. 
Federal and state  government lump-sum  transfer  to U.S. cities are included in A,  one 
major  component of which is (now obsolete) revenue-sharing aid.  Included in (T—J) are city 
291t would be preferable to use the probability of  deduction within the individual city, but this data does not 
exist  For their study of  aggregate state-local  taxation, Feldstein  and Metcalf (1987) were able to calculate deduction 
probabilities  by states which is an improvement 
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revenues (T)  from the two major  exogenously  set tax sources--local income taxation and local 
general sales  taxes-- less exogenously required  interest  payments on local government debt (I). 
Included as joint measures of the political benefits from providing core public  (Yg)  and 
private fee-based  (Yq)  services are average  resident income  in the city  (CINC, for residential 
demand),  percent of the  workforce who commute into the city  (PCOM, for commuter  and 
service-based business demand), the number  of  manufacturing sector jobs per capita (MANU, for 
heavy industry business demand).  CINC, PCOM,  and MANU  are each expected to increase the 
political benefits  from g and q service provision.  Included in Y  as unique measures of the 
political  benefits of core service provision are the variables ED (= 1, ii  city officials are fiscally 
responsible  for education, 0 if a fiscally independent school district is responsible)  and REAG ( 
1, for the fiscally  conservative years of the Reagan presidency, 0 otherwise).  It is reasonable to 
expect ED and REAG to have only "taste' effects (i.e., alter vIag only).  If  so, then ED should 
increase  r* andf.  Reagan's fiscal conservatism favored  smaller government spending on core 
services and increased privatization; if these preferences  carried over to local politics then  r* 
should fall and  may fall (smaller government) or rise (privatization) when REAG = 1. 
Direct estimates of  the tax base and user  fee elasticities, C and cq, are not avallable.  It is 
reasonable  to expect,  however, that these elasticities increase  (in absolute value) as the city's 
non-fiscal  amenities  decline  and  as  the  city's regional economy  becomes  more  fiscally 
competitive.  Such variables constitute the vector  Z.  Each regression will include  city-specific 
dummy variables ('City')  to control for across city differences in all non-fiscal amenities; the 
trend variable 'Time' will capture any uniform decline over  time in such amenities.  To measure 
regional fiscal competition I specify two variables:  RCSI which measures the ratio of city to 
suburban average income and the variable RCSI2.  Values of RCSI  near two appear to represent 
regions where suburban exit options for city households  and firms are most abundant;  see the 
Appendix.  Very low (less than 1.0) or very high (above 4.0)  values of  RCSI indicate limited  exit 
options for the average city resident, either because he or she is too poor (Newark) or too rich 
(Omaha  or San Antonio today) for the suburban alternatives.  Thus  Ca and  Eq  should be largest in 
absolute value as the region's value of RCSI approaches the range 2-3, and smallest for very high 
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or '.'ery  low values  of  RCSI.  This U-shape relationship of RCSI to e and eq  requires both RCSI 
and RCSI2 in the regressions. 
Measures of exogenous shifts in individual taxpayers shares, 3, include the state-set rates 
of taxation on income (denoted  7,) and on general  sales (denoted F).  For large U.S. cities, an 
increase in 7 will increase the rich taxpayer's share in total burdens (3) and should, under the 
special case redistribution  model outlined in ll.B, increase r* and reduce fk,  Conversely,  an 
increase in Y  will shift more of the aggregate local tax burden onto the poor  causing f3  for the 
poor to rise. If so, then under the special case redistribution model, r* should fall and  fk should 
rise. 
Measures of the exogenous redistribution  variables (1 
— 8) and a are not available by 
individual  cities;  the included city  dummy  variable  ('City')  should at least control  for their 
omitted effects.  More importantly, measures of the redistribution variables (1 
—  are available 
city  by city for each  of the local taxes.  However,  their  separate inclusion in each  revenue 
equation along with the average subsidy for property  taxation, (1 
— jt), proved uninformative 
because the variables are so highly collinear.  Therefore, only the property average rate (1 
— t) is 
included in the revenue equations.  Now, however, its estimated effect must be interpreted as 
measuring the joint effects of both the average subsidy  and the possible redistributive  effects 
from variations in the individual (1 
— 
'r1) '5; see section III below. 
The political influence  of the upper income cohort (Xr) is measured here by the size of  the 
rich coalition, the percent of households in the city  whose income exceeds the national 75th 
percentile income  level (PCR).  The  political  influence of the poor (Xe) is measured by the size 
of the city's poor coalition, the percent of city households whose income is below the national 
25th  percentile income level (PCP).  Since political influence is a relative concept, the effects of 
these two variables  on taxes and fees are measured relative to the residual influence of the city's 
middle class. 
Finally, two property tax limitation variables are specified, one for  soft' limitations (s) 
and one for 'hard" limitations (7). For hard  limitations the actual maximum tax rate available to 
the city is used.  For cities facing a soft limitation, a simple (1,0) dummy variable is used, where 
16 iS  .3 -25- 
s = 1 if the city faces a specific election or  administrative over-ride requirement before increasing 
rates, 0 otherwise. 
The dependent  variables  for the empirical  analysis  are  total property  tax revenues-- 
R (r) = r*B  (fl--and total fee-selective sales tax revenues--F (J) = f*q (J). While  the model and 
the comparative static analysis has been  constructed for tax rates and fees, accurate measures of r 
and f  were  not available for this study.  The extension of the model to property tax and fee 
revenues is straightforward, however.  Since the exogenous determinants of tax base and private 
service  demands have already been included in the analysis of r and f, tax and fee revenue 
equations can now be specified  as functions of  the measured exogenous variables as: 
(lOs) R =R{(1 —t),(1 —p),Time,(l—u),City,A  +T_I,Yg,Yq,Z,Xr,Xp,Fy,T,s} 
and 
(us) F=F{(l—c),(l—p),Time,(l—.L),City,A+T—I,Yg,Yq,Z,X,,Xp,Yy,Ys,s} 
for  cities with no, or soft, limitations only, and: 
(107)  R=R{Y,CB(Y,Yg,Z)} 
and 
(117) 
for cities  facing absolute property  tax limitations. 
The comparative static analysis for these F and  R equations are also simple extensions of 
the original analysis.  If the city's equilibrium values of r* and  place the cities on the rising 
portions of their profit and revenue  curves, then any change which increases (decreases) f* or 
will also increase (decrease) F and R.  This added restriction  seems a modest addition to the 
model's  final set of  maintained hypotheses.3° 
0Recent  empincal evidexke  supports the assumption  that cities are to be found on the rising portion of their tax 
revenue curves; see Ladd and Bradbury (1988), Sexton (1987) and Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (forthcoming). The 
estimated  long-run elasticities of property tax base with respect  to tax rates range from -.15 to -.53; thus increases in 
tax rates will increase revenues. 
(continued) 
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With the inclusion of  city-specific dummy  variables, revenue  eqs. (lOs)-(lls) and (107)— 
(117) define two 'fixed effects  models, where the city dummy  variables (City) control for all 
unmeasured  city-specific  determinants  of tax  rates and  fees.  Unbiased  estimates  of the 
coefficients for all remaining  time-varying  variables result;  see Hausman  and Taylor (1981). 
Further,  the model's error structure  is specified as additive and allows for possible first-order 
serial  autocorrelation,  heteroscedasticity,  and  the  correlation  of  errors  across  the  revenue 
equations.  All dollar variables  are measured in real (1967) dollars per capita. 
ifi. Estimation and Results 
A.  Estimation 
The revenue model was estimated for a sample of the forty-one largest  U.S. cities for the 
fiscal years 1961-1986.  Estimation  was by generalized least squares and allowed for a possible 
lagged response  of previous  period  revenues  on current period  fmancing.  This one period 
dynamic specification is  dL  bvs a crude approximation  to the true dynamic  structure of city 
revenue adjustments where tax rates and fees are likely to adjust relatively quickly while tax 
bases will adjust more slowly.  The coefficients on lagged own revenues--R_i and F_, in the R 
and F equations--will be an "average" of  these separate dynamic processes.3' 
To test for possible serial correlation of the equation errors, each revenue  equation was 
initially estimated city  by city using the 25 years of city  specific data  the lagged dependent 
variable was excluded as a regressor.  In all cases, the resulting Durbin-Watson test statistics 
were near 2 and the data could not reject the null hypothesis of no first-order  serial correlation. 
Demand studies for the major fee-based public services (hospitals, housing, and garbage collection) and 
selective  sales taxes (hotels, cigarettes, liquor) typically show price elasticities which axe also less than one. Thus 
increases  in fees will increase total fee revenue. 
31  specification used here might be motivated by arguing that the marginal effects of past changes in the 
model's exogenous  variables decline geometrically  with time--for  example, if  tax rates are adjusted  quickly (a large 
'impact" effect) and tax base responds slowly (a diminishing long-run effect).  Such a lag structure--called  the 
Koyck geometric  lag--would imply the specification  adopted here; see  Kmenta (1971, pp. 474-487). A theoretically 
more appropriate lag specification would allow for other than simple geometric adjustments--for  example, a lag 
distribution which permits marginal effects to first be positive and then negative. Estimation of such lag stnictures 
for a few of  the key policy variables would  be  a useful extension of  this work. 
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Heteroscedasticiry, however, is a potential  problem in this sample; thus, weighted least squares 
estimation  was employed  with the inverse  of city  population  used  as the preferred  weight. 
Further,  when  the  tax  and fee revenue equations  were jointly estimated  (three-staged  least 
squares), the correlation  of  equation errors revealed no significant across equation correlations. 
i'his observed  error structure  creates one final issue for model estimation.  The dynamic 
specification which includes the lagged value of the dependent variable as a regressor  may now 
involve  a correlation  between  each  equation's error  and the lagged dependent  variable;  see 
Kmenta  (1971, P.  479).  To obtain consistent estimates of the model's coefficients, instrumental 
variables estimation was employed using current and lagged values of the exogenous variables  of 
the model as instruments.32 Results based upon this weighted instrumental variables  estimation 
are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 reports parameter  estimates for the two  separate  tax limitation  regimes,  as 
required by the revenue model's specification.  Revenue equations  were  estimated  for cities 
facing no, or only 'soft", property tax limitations--eqs. (ls)-(3s) in Table 2 corresponding to eqs. 
(lOs)-(lls) above--and also for cities facing absolute property tax limits of the form r ￿ 7—eqs. 
(lr)-(3r) in Table 2 corresponding to eqs. (lOr)-(l  ir) above.  An F test as to the appropriateness 
of the regime split was performed; the null hypothesis that the two samples could be combined 
(i.e., no regime difference) was rejected at the .01 level for each revenue  equation (F(59, 956) = 
12.82 (R), = 3.32 (Fee) and = 6.836 (SST)).  Further, an F test for the exclusion restriction of the 
tax preference variables  ((1 — c), (1 
— p), Xr, Xi,, 7 and Y) supports the hypothesized source of 
the regime difference; the null hypothesis that these variables can be excluded  from the property 
2mere  is another possible souice of simultaneity in this model,  as noted by Feldstein and Metcalf  (1987). The 
rate of  subsidy from federal tax deductibility will depend upon the taxpayer's marginal tax brket  which depends 
upon taxable income which in turn depends the level of  deductible state and local taxes.  Such simultaneity can be 
avoided, however, if  the rate of  taxation used to estimate (1 -t) is based upon income befxe the  first dollar of 
deductions. This is the procedure I have used here when estimating  (1- t). 
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tax èuation  for absolute tax limit cities cannot  be rejected at the .01 level of significance (F(6, 
227) = 2.12). 
Table 2 also reports separate econometric results for user fees and selective sales taxation, 
treated originally as  a single endogenous  variable.  Since we are estimating  revenue equations 
rather than  price  or selective tax rate equations,  this natural  correspondence  is no longer 
appropriate.  User fee revenues  (denoted  Fee  in Table  2)  equal  f*q (7) and  measure total 
revenues from the service, inclusive of service costs (= c*q (7)).  Selective sales tax revenues 
(denoted SST in Table 2) equal t*q (7) and measure net profits from the taxed service, exclusive 
of service  costs.  Thus  while the exogenous  variables of the model  should have the same 
qualitative  effects  on  Fee  and  SST,  the  magnitude  of  the  effects--i.e.,  the  regression 
coefficients--will differ.  A formal  test  of the hypothesis  of identical  regression coefficients 
rejects that hypothesis at the .01 level of significance for each tax regime (F(50, 1400) =  14.78 
for no limit and F(26, 600) = 53.38 for limit regimes).  Separate estimation of the two revenue 
equations is therefore appropriate. 
Finally, the statistical significance  of the lagged dependent variables in each estimated 
revenue  equation suggests dynamics  are important to local revenue  choice.  Other studies (e.g., 
Ladd and Bradbury  (1988) and Sexton  (1987)) suggest  that property tax bases  change  only 
slowly in response to rate changes, and even then, the changes in base are modest.  If  so, then the 
dynamics observed here reflect lags in the political decision process over the choice variables r 
andf.  The estimated coefficients imply that both fees and tax rates are adjusted rather  quickly, 
reaching at least 80% of  their new  equilibrium  rates within two years.34 
33A similar test for the no limit cities confirms that these tax preference variables  do belong in that sample's 
property tax equation (F(6,  664) = 7.50). 
There is an additional difference between the  two regimes' property tax equations in the way that the jointly  izluded exogenous  variables  influenceR; see section ffl-C below. 
An exogenously induced $1 change in R, Fee, or SST in the first fiscal year will eveliLually inply a $1.78 
(=$1/(l - .437)) equilibrium change  inR,a$1.32(=$1/(1 - .242)) equilibrium change  in Fee, anda$1.84(=$l/(1. 
.457)) equilibrium change in SST.  After two years the estimated  changes are $1.44 inR, $1.24 in Fee, and $1.46 in 
SST, eseh at least 80% of  the way to their new equilibrium. 
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B. Results:  The "Soft" Limit Regime 
The estimated coefficients of eqs.  (ls)-(3s) in Table  2  confirm the comparative  static 
predictions of the  soft-limit  revenue model presented  in  Section  II,  conditional  upon  the 
maintained  hypothesis  that  cities are on  the rising  portions  of their  revenue  schedules.  Of 
particular  interest  is the effect on revenues of the average tax subsidy  variable, (1 — t).  An 
explanation for (1 
— 'c) 's perhaps counter-intuitive  effects is offered below; it draws upon this 
model's  distinction between efficiency  and redistributive motivations for local fiscal choice. 
The uniform tax subsidy variable  (1 —p) does influence revenues as expected.  As more 
and more  of the burden of an average dollar of property taxation falls on the residential base, 
there is a move away from the use of this tax and towards  the use of fees.  The estimated 
short-run elasticity  of tax revenues with respect to (1 —p) is -.13 (calculated at sample means) 
while the short-run  elasticity  of fees with respect to  (1 —p) is .22.  Long-run, equilibrium 
elasticities allowing for the effect of the lagged dependent variables on revenues are -.23 for R 
and .30  for Fee." In the end, the two revenue  effects from a change in (1 —p) just about  cancel 
each other, leaving  total own revenues  (= R + Fee + SST, with marginal effects calculated as the 
sum of  regression coefficients) and thus  city spending largely unaffected. 
Of the three grants-in-aid variables,  capital matching  aid, (1 
— i&), has no significant 
effect (statistically or quantitatively)  on current  own revenues; a plausible result given that city 
capital outlays are largely debt financed.  Current accounts matching aid (1 
— t) is for welfare 
services  and this  aid does  affect  own  revenues, increasing property  taxation  and fees  and 
reducing selective  sales  taxation  as  the matching rate  declines.  The results  imply welfare 
assistance  is  price  inelastic--that  is,  as  the welfare  matching  rate  is  reduced  own  welfare 
expenditures rise requiring  an increase  in own revenues.  Those  revenues come from property 
taxation (biased towards the poor)  and fees.  Offsetting the increase in fees is a reduction in 
lag adjustment models such as this one, long-run marginal  effects of changes in exogenous variables  are 
calculated as the esumated regression coefficient (the impact effect of  a change) times the equilibrium 'multiplier 
effect" allowing for the influence of the lagged dependent variable.  For  the soft-limit  sample these multipliers  are 
equal to 1/(1  -  .437) for property taxation, 11(1 -  .242) for fees, and 11(1 - .457) for selective sales taxation;  see 
Kmenta (1971, p. 479). 
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selective sales taxation.  Finally,  increases in lump-sum grants (A) and  exogenous own revenues 
net of interest payments ( 
— i) reduce property taxation and fees about equally,  but most of 
these new  monies stay within the budget for current  expenditures.36 
The  two  variables  meant  to  describe  the  potential  elasticity  of  city  revenue 
schedules--RCSI  and  RCSI2--are  (nearly)  always  significant  and  their  effects  are  always 
U-shaped as anticipated.  Tax and fee revenues are lowest  (implying base elasticities are highest) 
when the region's RCSI is between 2 and  3.  Selective sales taxation reaches a minimum for 
RCSI = 4.7, the very upper end of our sample's values.  RCSI  seem to capture important  regional 
differences  in the process of fiscal competition.  Cities with high values  of RCSI face  no 
competitive suburban fringe and local own revenues and spending are larger.  Cities with low 
values  of RCSI contain  residents  too  poor to exit to the  average suburb  and again  fiscal 
competition  is low, and, ceteris paribus, own revenues  and spending  are  again  higher. Using the 
same  measure of  fiscal competition,  Inman (1982) has presented some evidence that these higher 
expenditures are often captured by public unions in the form of  higher wages and benefits. 
Of the service demand  variables,  average city  income  (CINC)  and responsibility  for 
education (ED) increase taxes and/or fees, while percent commuters (PCOM),  manufacturing 
jobs per capita (MANU), and a time dummy  variable for the Reagan presidency  (REAG) alter 
the mix of financing  in plausible  ways.  Burdens  are  shifted  from  taxpaying  residents  to 
fee-paying  non-residents as PCOM rises, from fee-paying businesses to taxpayers  as MANU 
increases, and from  taxes to fees with the Reagan appeal to "privatize" government  financing. 
The  presence  of "soft" property  tax limitations do reduce the use of the tax (by about 12% 
from the mean in the long-run) and increase fees by a nearly equal amount  Soft property tax 
limitations control  taxes but not total revenues or government spending. 
Of the included  redistributive  variables,  increases  in Y  stimulate  property taxation 
(marginally)  and reduce fees  and selective  sales  taxation  (significantly) as predicted by the 
The variables  A and (1'-  i) were also entered separately in these regressions; their separately estimated 
effects on R, Fee and SST were neatly identical. Thus combining  the variables  as our thetxy suggests is appropriate. 
This is not the case in absolute  limitation  model, however see  below at fri.  39. 
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redistributive model outlined  in section ILB.  Increases in 7, have exactly the opposite effects, 
also as predicted.  Of the two political influence variables, increases in the percent poor (PCP) 
stimulate  fees  and  selective  sales  taxation and  discourage  property  taxation  as  expected. 
Increases  in the percent  of taxpayers who  are rich leads  to reductions in all taxes, however, 
perhaps reflecting  the very wealthy's reduced demands  for city services in addition to their 
redisiributive preferences. 
It is the statistically significant effect on revenue mix of the average property tax subsidy 
(1 
— c) which remains as a possible puzzle.  There are two possible explanations.  First,  the 
prediction that dr*/d(1 
— c) <0 is correct, but the estimates here based on a revenue equation 
reveal cities to be on the downward side of their revenue  curves where rate reductions increase 
revenues.  The recent work of Sexton (1987), Ladd and Bradbury (1988), and Holtz-Eakin and 
Rosen (forthcoming) reject this interpretation.  There is a second explanation consistent with the 
redistribution model.  As estimated,  (1 
— c) is being asked to play two roles, one as an average 
subsidy to property taxation  and the other as a proxy for the redisthbutive  effects on local 
taxation of federal and state tax policies.  As constructed, the main source of  variation in (1 
— 'r) 
is from the deductibility  of local taxes  from federal and state income taxation.  This subsidy 
benefits  only those  who  deduct,  specifically  middle  and upper income  homeowners.  Thus 
variation in the included average  subsidy  (1 
— c) is effectively  variation in the income-target 
subsidy (1 
— 'v) received by the rich.  As (1 
— c) for the rich increases,  for the rich is also 
increased.  From the redistributive model outlined  in ll.B, therefore, the resulting rise in 13  for 
the  rich should stimulate an increase  in property taxation and a reduction in fees and selective 
sales taxation.  This is what we do observe.  Further, the other average subsidy variable in the 
model, (1 — p), does not discriminate by income  class or affect 13, but it  does influence revenues 
as predicted by  the  average  subsidy  effect?  Together  these  results  imply  roles  for  both 
should note that Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (forthcoming)  do obtain a negaivc effect of (1 — t) on property 
taxation for  their sample of  cities. Their sample,  however, is dominated by small to middle sized suburban  commu- 
nities with income homogeneous populations and (most likely) uniform assessment for propty taxation.  In such 
cities the avezge  subsidy effect of  the variable  (1 — t)  is likely to dominate  any redislribuiive  effects. 
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redistribution  politics and excess-burden-minimizing  behavior  as  separate explanations for the 
local decision to tax. 
C. Results:  The Absolute Limit Regime 
Table 2,  eqs.  (lr)-(3r) provide  estimates of the revenue model  for those cities of our 
sample living under an absolute property tax rate limit, r ￿ 7.  All cities in this subsample are 
known to be at their constrairn.  The fact that the tax rate constraint is binding for these cities 
implies the property  tax equilibrium will be defined fully by the constraint (7) and the variables 
in the model which  determine tax base.  Thus all tax preference variables which uniquely define 
the slopes of the tax rate indifference  curves in Figure 2--(l — 'r), (1 —p), K, ,  , and Y  and 
7 —become irrelevant in the property tax equation.38 These tax preference variables may still 
influence fees and selective  sales taxation, however, and are therefore retained in those revenue 
equations; see Table 2. 
For  the property tax equation,  an F test confirms the exclusion  restriction for the tax 
preference variables.  Further,  the included  exogenous  variables other  than  7 all  seem  to 
influence property  tax revenues through their effects on tax base as predicted by the constrained 
specification.  Qualitatively, these variables  behave here as they might in a total property value 
capitalization equation.  City mean income (CINC), manufacturing jobs per capita (MANU), and 
a large commuter  workforce  (PCOM)  measure  increased  residential  and  business  property 
investments.  Given r = 7, increased  current  matching  aid  (pc)  or  lump-sum  transfers 
(A +  — i)  mean more current  period public services and higher tax bases, ceteris  paribus.39  In 
the same vein, the Reagan presidency was particularly hard on central city budgets--numerous 
small aid programs not measured in A were cut--and further  depressed center  city tax bases.  As 
38Further, there is no need to estimate the model  as part of a "switching  regime" specification. We know before 
estimation  that all constrained  cities are at  the constraint,  and, for  this paper at  least,  the constraint  is exogenous. 
As  part of  a capitalization equation,  A, 7', and I  might well have different effects on tax base. Increases in A 
and reductions in I should unambiguously increase base, but 7' will only do so if  inereased government spending 
more than  compensates  for the increase in own exogenous  taxes.  This is in ft  what we do  observe when the effects 
of  the three variables are estimated separately, further  confirming the mterpretation  of  the R equation  as a tax base 
equation. Aid  increases revenues, I  lowers own  property tax revenues, and i'  is negative  but  inSignificanL 
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before, capital matching aid is insignificant  for current accounts  financing.  Finally,  the two 
variables meant  to measure regional  tax competition--RCSI and RCSI2--are no longer significant 
in the property tax equation.  This is as it should be since rate constrained cities cannot compete 
through property taxation. 
In contrast, the exogenous variables in the fee and selective sales tax equations ought to 
influence  those  revenues  much as predicted  for the unconstrained model.  On the whole, this is 
what we do observe; the explanations in IILB  apply here as well.  The two exceptions are the 
negative effect on fees of the net price for welfare (1 
— t)  and the positive effect on selective 
sales taxation of percent  rich (PCR). 
What are the effects of  the tax limitation  itself on local revenue choice?  It  is  important to 
note that the estimated results in eqs. (lr)-(3r) apply only to city revenue choice once the city has 
fallen under limitation.  The  coefficients  for the variable 7 in Table  2 do nor measure the revenue 
effects of the move from no limitations to absolute limitation; that must be estimated separately. 
Table 3 provides those estimates  of revenue  changes for sample cities whose states did impose a 
limit during our study period (1961-1986), estimated as the difference  between predicted city 
revenues when unconstrained (using eqs. (ls)-(3s))  and actual city revenues  under the constraint. 
Table 3's estimates are the average by state of those changes for all cities in all years following 
the imposition of 7.  Tax  limitations  have had large negative effects  on the levels of local 
property  taxation,  and  while  fees  and selective sales  taxation  sometimes  increase,  only in 
California have they offset the large declines in property taxation.  New Orleans, long a user of 
sales and income taxes, is the only sample city unaffected by its new property tax constraint. 
Once cities are within the tax limitation regime, however, redistributive politics returns to 
the floor.  What  the coefficients  for  in Table  2 do reveal are the effects on revenues  of 
increasing the limit, once the city has been constrained.  Property taxes rise (but only slightly) as 
7 is increased,  while total revenues  from  fees  and selective  sales  taxation  declines.  Total 
spending is only marginally affected.  Ttiese are the predictions of  the redistribution model. 
16.183 Table 3:  Introducing  Tax Limitations* 
Sample State 
Revenue  Change in: 
R  Fee  SST 



















































measures  the average level change of revenue for all sample cities in the state for 
all years following the introduction of limitations. Standard  error of the estimated 
change is within parentheses.  Measured as real (1967) dollars per capita.  % 
measures the ratio of the average change to the average revenue  level of the tax one 
year before the introduction of limitations. 
**SST are new taxes introduced  following the limitation;  the %  is  therefore infmite. 
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IV. Does Deductibility Influence Local Taxation? 
No recent issue in U.S. local government finance has been more seriously researched and 
debated than the effects of the removal  of federal deductibility for state and local taxes.  Prior to 
the federal Tax Reform  Act of 1986, all state and local taxes except for fees and selective sales 
(excise) taxes could be deducted from federal  taxable income  by an itemizing taxpayer.  The 
debate preceding the 1986 reforms contemplated the full removal  of  these deductions, though in 
the end, only the deductibility of sales taxation was disallowed.  l'hree arguments were offered 
for their removal.  First, deductibility is useful only for itemizing federal taxpayers, primarily 
concentrated in the upper ends of the U.S. income  distribution.  Deductibility therefore  makes the 
federal tax structure less progressive.  Second, as a subsidy for local taxation, deductibility may 
create a "false  incentive to overspend on local government  services, or encourage  the use of 
taxes over economically more efficient user fees.  Finally, deductibility was estimated to have 
cost the U.S. Treasury $32.4 billion in lost revenues  in FY  1985,  certainly a helpful sum for a 
federal  government  struggling  to control  a rising budgetary  deficit.  On  their  face,  these 
economic arguments for disallowance seem persuasive, but each ignores the reality of the local 
decision to tax.  Removing local deductibility may, or may not, improve U.S. fiscal performance. 
To resolve the issue we must see how state and local governments will react to the reform. Table 
4 summarizes the likely responses of  this sample's cities. 
The full removal  of  federal deductibility for all local taxes will increase the average net of 
subsidy cost of  local property  taxation (1  — 'C) from .86 to .96 (state income tax deductibility and 
state property  tax relief assumed to remain) and (1 
— t) for income and sales taxation from .88 to 
.98 (state income tax deductibility assumed to remain).  The estimated impact and equilibrium 
effects of these increases on each source of local own revenues are reported in Table 4 for the 
two subsamples, based upon the estimated coefficient for (1 — 'C) reported in Table  2. 
Dropping federal tax deductibility does have a potentially significant effect on the mix of 
local revenues.  The loss of  deductibility initially increases the bunlen share of city taxation for 
middle and upper income households.  In both no-limit and absolute-limit cities, redistnbutive 
local politics appears to compensate  for this added  burden on the rich by reducing fees  and 
16.18.3 Table  4:  Removing Deductibility 
Sample 
Effects on Revenues 
aR  AFee  LXSST  aRevenuet 
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
No Limit  t$%S 
Impact*  $1.89  -$1.23  -$1.01  -$35 
(3.00%)  (-1.22%)  (-4.86%)  (-.18%) 
Equilibrium**  $3.36  -$1.62  -$1.86 
(5.32%)  (-1.60%)  (-8.96%)  (-.07%) 
AsoluteLmnt 
Impact*  0  -$9.49  -$.33  -$9.82 
(-8.42%)  (-1.94%)  (-5.00%) 
Equilibrium**  0  -$23.32  -$.57  -$23.89 
(-20.68%)  (-3.44%)  (-12.18%) 
ta.Revenue  = zR ÷ 6.Fee + 6.SST 
*Jmpact effects estimated as A(1  — 'c) = .10 times  the estimated coefficient  for (1 
— t) for 
each  endogenous  revenue source;  see  Table  2.  All dollar amounts  are real (1967) 
dollars per capita; (%) measures  the percentage  change from FY 1986 avenge sample 
revenue. 
**Equilibrijim effects estimated as the impact effect adjusted for the estimated  effect of 
lagged revenues  from Table 2.  All dollar amounts are real (1967) dollars per capita; 
(%) measures the percentage  change  from FY 1986 avenge sample  revenue. 
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selective sales taxation.  In an effort to maintain  local services, there is an offsetting increase in 
property  taxation in those (no-limit) cities which are legally allowed to do so; the impact and 
equilibrium decline in government spending  is less than $1 in these no limit cities.  Cities under 
absolute property tax limitations do not have the property tax option, however, so the full effect 
of reduced fees and selective sales taxation will be  felt as reduced government services.  One 
might  well expect redistributive services for  the poor to be the most vulnerable; see Chernick and 
Reschovsky (1986).  The  equilibrium  reduction  in local variable revenues in these tax limit  cities 
may  be  as much 12%; as a percent of total city revenues for current  services the equilibrium 
decline will  be 7.5%. 
Three conclusions seem warranted from these results.  First, while removing deductibility 
will increase the progressivity of the federal tax code, it  is likely to make the local tax structure in 
larger U.S.  cities marginally  more  regressive  as property  taxation is increased  and fees  are 
lowered.  Second, total local government spending in large cities may be reduced but the cuts 
will not be large.  If  property  taxes can be increased then they will almost fully offset the decline 
in fees and selective  sales  taxation.  If city  property  taxes  are constrained,  then  local  own 
revenues and government spending will decline but by no more  than 3-7%.  Third, the  U.S. 
Treasury will collect more money from taxpayers in large cities.  Local taxes originally favored 
by deductibility  are either constrained  by  state  policy  (income and sales)  or rise  slightly 
(property).  Only local fees and selective sales taxes are reduced, but business fees, at least, are 
still  a  deductible  expense.  Thus  Treasury's revenues  from  this  sample's cities  will 
unambiguously increase. 
This last policy  conclusion  is in direct contrast to the conclusion in Feldstein and Metcalf 
(1987) who  find  that removing  state  and local tax deductibility may well  reduce Treasury's 
revenues.  Using state-local aggregate taxation from property plus income plus sales taxation as 
their dependent variable,  Feldstein-Metcalf find that an increase in  (1 — 'r) reduces  the use of 
these deductible taxes and increases the use of  fees.  Since fees are still deductible by business 
firms, the substitution of fees for personal taxes induced  by the increase in (1 
— t) will reduce 
Treasury savings from dropping  deductibility and may actually turn the savings into a loss. 
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Though the policy conclusions of the two studies differ, the underlying analytical results 
need not  be in conflict.  The Feldstein-Metcalf  analysis seeks  to explain  the variation in the 
aggregate of state and local taxes from property  plus income plus sales taxation.  Each of these 
taxes is variable in an aggregate state-local model.  The total tax variable will respond to the 
negative average subsidy effect of  changes in (1 
— t) but also  to redistributive  effects. However, 
the redistributive effects following reform will likely have their biggest effects on the mix of 
taxation, not on total  taxation.  It  is not inconsistent, therefore, for the Feldstein-Metcalf study to 
find a significant negative  effect  of (1 
— t) on total personal taxation  for all state  and local 
governments,  and for this  study  to find a significant  positive  effect  on  (just) city  property 
taxation.  The Feldstein-Metcalf results help us to understand the aggregate effects on Treasury 
revenues  of tax reform.  The results here allow us to look at reform's effects on a large city 
subsample and on the mix of  local financing. 
Interestingly, it appears to be redisiributive politics' effects on the mix of taxation which 
has determined the state and local response to the actual reforms in the Tax Act of 1986.  Only 
deductibility for state-local sales taxation  was removed.  Since that time, state and local sales tax 
rates have either remained  constant or have increased, while state income tax rates have been 
reduced.  This outcome is in direct contrast  to the predictions of the representative  taxpayer's 
average subsidy  effect.  It is, however, exactly the result expected from this tax model  with 
redistribution politics where increases in r, and reductions in r reduce the rich's share of the 
burden of state and local taxation (see p. 23 above).  With the loss of  deductibility  as a federal 
subsidy to richer local taxpayers, r has been increased and r has been reduced to restore the 
politically preferred distribution of the aggregate state and  local net tax burden. 
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V.  A Concluding Comment 
What we do not like is that we are taxed--not that we are stupidly taxed. 
(W)hen  we have gotten angry about it in the past our rulers have not troubled 
themselves  to study  political  economy in order to find  out  the best means of 
appeasing us.  Generally they have simply shifted the burden from the shoulders 
of those  who  complained,  and  were  able to make  things unpleasant,  to  the 
shoulders of those who might  complain, but could not give much trouble. 
Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1885, p.  131. 
Woodrow Wilson seems  to have it right. If  there is one strong impression which  emerges 
from this analysis it is this: There are important incentives implicit within local redisthbutive 
politics which define a  community's  decision  to tax, incentives  not  accurately modeled  or 
estimated  by  the  familiar representative  taxpayer  model  of fiscal  politics.  By  focusing 
exclusively on the preferences of an average taxpayer and on minimizing the excess (or  stupid") 
burdens from taxation, those models necessarily exclude current period redistributive incentives 
from local fiscal choice.  In large U.S. cities, at least, that appears to be a mistake.  The analysis 
here finds an important role for  variables  thought to influence the structure of local  redistributive 
politics but which are arguable excluded from the representative taxpayer model.  Exogenous 
changes which shift the balance of local tax burdens among income groups induce a pattern of 
revenue adjustments which move to restore that balance.  Indeed, the estimated effects of one of 
the model's central policy variables--the deductibility of  local taxes--can only be understood in 
this light.  Whether this redistributive  approach and these empirical results generalize to other 
governments remains to be seen.  At a minimum, however, the results suggest caution in the use 
of the representative  taxpayer model for  the behavioral  analysis of large government fiscal 
policy.  Hopefully, too,  the results will encourage further theoretical work on the modeling of 
redisiributive fiscal policy in large, income  diverse polities. 
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16.18.3 Appendix: City Sample 
City  RCSI* 
Tax Limitation Status 
No  "Soft"  Absolute 
Atlanta  1.567  1961-86  --  -- 
Baltimore  1.102  1961-86  --  -- 
BirTningham  1.300  --  1961-79  1980-86  (7,,, = .02) 
Boston  1.773  1961-80  --  1981-86  (7,,, = .025) 
Buffalo  1.525  --  •-  1961-86  (7,,, = .02) 
Chicago  1.514  1961-86  --  -- 
Cincinnati  1.824  --  --  1961-86  (7, = .01) 
Cleveland  1.229  --  --  1961-86  (7,. = .01) 
Columbus  1.510  --  --  1961-86  (7,. = .01) 
Dallas  2.652  1961-76  1977-86 
Denver  2.384  --  1961-86 
Detroit  1.442  1961-86  -- 
Ft. Worth  2.178  1961-76  1977-86 
Houston  2.284  1961-76  1977-86 
Indianapolis  2.668  1961-73  1974-86 
Kansas City  1.653  1961-78  1979-86  -- 
Long Beach  2.143  1961-78  --  1979-86  (7,,, = .01) 
Los  Angeles  2.102  1961-78  --  1979-86  (7,,, = .01) 
Louisville  1.525  --  --  1961-86  (7,. = .015) 
Memphis  2.097  1961-86  -- 
Milwaukee  1.439  1961-73  1974-86 
Minneapolis  1.905  1961-73  1974-86  -- 
Newark  1.221  1961-76  --  1977-86  (7,,, =  .025) 
New Orleans  1.732  1961-74  --  1975-86  (7,. = .01) 
New York  1.713  --  --  1961-86  (7.,, =  .025) 
Norfolk  1.617  1961-86  --  -- 
Oakland  2.024  1961-78  --  1979-86  (7,, = .01) 
Oklahoma  City  2.507  --  --  1961-86  (7,. = .015) 
Omaha  2.963  1961-79  1980-86  -- 
Philadelphia  1.612  1961-86  --  -- 
Phoenix  2.756  1961-80  --  1981-86  (7,,, = .01) 
Pittsburgh  1.727  •-  1961-86  -. 
Portland  2.094  --  1961-86  -- 
Rochester  1.306  --  --  1961-86  (7,,, = .02) 
San  Diego  2.577  1961-78  --  1979-86  (7,, = .01) 
San  Fraacisco  2.240  1961-78  --  1979-86  (7,,, = .01) 
San  Antonio  2.801  1961-76  1977-86 
Seattle  2.202  1961-71  1972-86 
St. Louis  1.583  1961-78  1979-86 
St. Paul  1.437  1961-73  1974-86  -- 
Toledo  1.565  --  •-  1961-86  (7,. =  .01) 
*The city's average Ratio of City Income per capita  to Suburban Income per capita over  the sample 
period, 1961-1986. Source: Sales and Marketing Management, Survey of  Buying Power; 1960-1986. 
a*Fal  years in which tax limitation applies; 7 is the exogenously set tax rate  denoted 7,,, if set as a  limit 
on market value or 7,. if set as a  ("mill rate") limit on asessed value.  Source  ACIR, Significant Features 
of  Fiscal Federalism, 1980-8  1 Edition. 
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